Resisting Abstraction: Gramsci’s Historiological Method by Greaves, Nigel
International Gramsci Journal 
Volume 1 
Issue 3 International Gramsci Journal Article 6 
2011 
Resisting Abstraction: Gramsci’s Historiological Method 
Nigel Greaves 
University of Kurdistan, Iraq 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci 
Recommended Citation 
Greaves, Nigel, Resisting Abstraction: Gramsci’s Historiological Method, International Gramsci 
Journal, 1(3), 2011, 37-56. 
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci/vol1/iss3/6 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Resisting Abstraction: Gramsci’s Historiological Method 
Abstract 
This article argues that the writings of Antonio Gramsci should be situated in their rightful social, 
philosophical, political, in short, 'historical' context. This is particularly true of his prison writing which is a 
rich resource but one which calls for delicate archaeological handling. It appears that Gramsci’s Marxism 
is unapologetically eclectic but this results in an integrated and surprisingly harmonious theoretical and 
practical approach to history and society. This can be brought to sharp focus only by close examination of 
the educational properties of Gramsci’s historical environment, the suggestions it makes, the perceptible 
possibilities it entails, that which blocks or impedes movement and progress, and so on. That is to say, 
Gramsci was not an abstract thinker. His thinking is grounded in the class war of the Italy of his time and, 
in turn, this was attuned to the broader struggle against capitalism in and beyond Italy's borders. This is 
arguably the way Gramsci would prefer to be remembered and indeed the context in which he would 
perhaps prefer to be utilised today. Reading Gramsci, therefore, requires knowing Gramsci. The problems 
encountered are an unfortunate consequence of the conditions in which he wrote but they can be 
overcome if we apply ‘Gramsci to Gramsci’. 
This journal article is available in International Gramsci Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci/vol1/iss3/6 
INTERNATIONAL GRAMSCI JOURNAL  
NO. 3 MARCH 2011 
 
 
Resisting Abstraction:  









This article argues that the writings of Antonio Gramsci should be situated in their rightful social, philosophical, 
political, in short, 'historical' context. This is particularly true of his prison writing which is a rich resource but 
one which calls for delicate archaeological handling.  It appears that Gramsci’s Marxism is unapologetically 
eclectic but this results in an integrated and surprisingly harmonious theoretical and practical approach to history 
and society. This can be brought to sharp focus only by close examination of the educational properties of 
Gramsci’s historical environment, the suggestions it makes, the perceptible possibilities it entails, that which 
blocks or impedes movement and progress, and so on. That is to say, Gramsci was not an abstract thinker. His 
thinking is grounded in the class war of the Italy of his time and, in turn, this was attuned to the broader struggle 
against capitalism in and beyond Italy's borders. This is arguably the way Gramsci would prefer to be 
remembered and indeed the context in which he would perhaps prefer to be utilised today. Reading Gramsci, 
therefore, requires knowing Gramsci. The problems encountered are an unfortunate consequence of the 
conditions in which he wrote but they can be overcome if we apply ‘Gramsci to Gramsci’. 
 
Dr. Nigel M. Greaves is a lecturer in political theory at the University of Kurdistan Hawler, Kurdish Regional 
Adminstered N. Iraq.  
Email contact: nmgreaves@gmail.com 
 













How is Antonio Gramsci remembered today?  More to the point, how should he be 
remembered?  By drawing on the insights of Gramsci himself, this article proposes an 
interpretive stance which might allow for a more sensitive historiological treatment of his 
intellectual legacy than we have sometimes witnessed in the last few decades.  It argues 
Gramsci's mature writing imparts a method for textual interpretation that allows for the 
precise location of the meaning and function of his ideas.   
     
Gramsci has attracted intense interest in academia since his Prison Notebooks (Quaderni) 
were first published in English in 1971.  Much of the flurry of subsequent literature is a 
credit-worthy attempt to recover the meaning of his work and its significance in the 
contemporary world (see Martin, 2002; Morton, 2003).  However, others have identified 
certain ambiguities in order to modify Gramsci to the support of their particular 
preoccupations and assumptions (i.e., Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  This is problematic on 
methodological grounds.   
 
Whilst there is some appeal in not ‘closing the circle’ and leaving Gramsci’s work open-
ended, any dismissal of the historical context of his intellectual output runs the risk of 
sacrificing the original author's meaning and intent.  There is always an intimate relationship 
between ideas and extant conditions.  Gramsci stressed this repeatedly in his interpretation, 
for example, of the neo-Hegelian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), Machiavelli, 
Marx and many others.  Therefore, why not apply Gramsci to Gramsci?  Here, Stuart Hall 
writes: “[i]t is, after all, Gramsci himself who first taught us how to ‘read Gramsci’” (1991:7).  
Moreover, Hall continues: “[Gramsci] made it possible for us to read Marx again, in a new 
way” (1991:8).  What all this means, though, is open to debate.   
 
For Gramsci, Marxism represents the culmination of a historical struggle for ‘self-
consciousness’ which enables the human mass to understand itself and point out to it what it 
is capable of becoming.  Indeed, Gramsci’s work within Marxism is largely a refinement of 
the assumption that the body of ideas it represents is the philosophy of the proletariat, the 
advanced historical force.  Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) work has moved the debate on, and 
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once assumed a sort of vanguard trend in Gramscian studies that strips Marxism and indeed 
Gramsci of all social and historical location.  It entails the association of Gramsci’s Marxism 
with the deconstructive epistemology of postmodernism in various ways, bringing forth 
‘post-Marxism’.  This attempt at Kuhnian (Kuhn, 1970) ‘paradigm-busting’ renders the 
current condition of the Marxist tradition - to which Gramsci undoubtedly belongs – an 
exercise in reaction (Daly, 1999:62); Enlightenment metaphysics (Daly, 1994:178); modernist 
idealism (Docherty, 1996:71); or as Sim, (2000:35) puts it “control freakery”.  It seems to me 
that the weak spot in all of this is its inherent a-historicism.  Post-Marxism offers no account 
of history and yet it seeks to experiment with the ideas of a great, if not the greatest, 
historicist.     
 
  
Current Uses (and Misuses?) of Gramsci 
 
 How is Gramsci remembered today?  To a significant extent, the answer merely requires 
us to observe how Gramsci’s ideas are being currently used.  Generally speaking, Gramsci 
was a class agent in the Leninist tradition, and yet much contemporary literature defuses the 
true character of his radicalism and smoothes his transition into mainstream political science, 
sociology, and what has become ‘cultural studies’.   
 
As Boggs (1984:282-3) anticipated, leftists in academia today seeking to maintain critical bite, 
but wishing to relinquish the ontological baggage of historical materialism (i.e. Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985), have seized on the thrust of Gramsci’s anti-economism, albeit without the 
originator’s strict historiological qualifications.  The assumption appears to be that Gramsci’s 
work on hegemony alone provides a de-ontological platform for social, political and cultural 
analysis which can be readily adapted to the current postmodern intellectual turn. This is all 
very well, as nothing is sacred, but can it be said to properly derive from Gramsci?  
Gramsci’s schema is so loaded with potential it can, it seems, be made to mean anything at 
all.  As David Harris notes, to be Gramscian today could mean to be an advocate of a good 
many strategies of ‘enrichment’ of the founder of the school of thought, and yet nothing at 
all definitive (1992:27).  In many ways this is true of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), who invoke 
the authority of Gramsci in replacing class struggle with a determinant-free, antagonistic 
politics.   
 
Gramsci’s current usage is not entirely heterodox.  He undoubtedly shares with the Cultural 
Studies fraternity, and indeed the early Frankfurt School, concern for the role of the cultural 
and ideological dimensions of social life in moulding consensus, and that society has to be 
viewed therefore in Hegelian terms as a ‘divided unity’.  Indeed, this is the underlying 
assumption of Stuart Hall’s activity at the University of Birmingham.  Yet, as Dworkin 
points out, cultural studies has tended to analyse the question, and to see the potential for 
creating subversive identities, increasingly from the subjective and secondary perspective of 
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products and consumerism, not production itself (1997:5-6).  Harris puts it wryly: “[w]e have 
heard a good deal about the proletarian shopper” (1992:205).  
 
In a sense, with the demand for Marxists to think creatively, Gramsci’s current popularity in 
the academy is a consequence of his bid to upgrade Marxism for the twentieth century.  No 
less a figure than Althusser says that Gramsci provides “completely original… insights into 
the problem… of the superstructures” (Althusser, 1965:114).  This is amplified by a number 
of seasoned contemporary scholars (Buci-Glucksmann, 1982; Showstack Sassoon, 1980; 
Dimitrakos, 1986; Anderson, 1976; Femia, 1975:45; Hoffman, 1984; Mercer, 1980; Bobbio, 
1979; etc).  At bottom, Gramsci's great feat was to adapt Marx and Engels to the Hegelian 
concept of civil society and the role of ideas in securing the state such that ideas were to 
receive dialectical parity with economics.  However, Texier reminds us that this certainly 
does not mean that Gramsci takes us back to the Hegelian ‘man standing on his head’ and a 
“disembodied” conception of human creativity (1979:60).     
 
It should be acknowledged, however, that a consequence of Gramsci’s elevation of 
subjective factors to dialectical parity with infrastructures is debate concerning his epistemic 
trajectory.  This coincides today with the supposed arrival of a postmodern condition.  
Indeed, based on the textual flavour of his prison writing it has been said that Gramsci is a 
precursor of the postmodern turn (Landry, 2000:145; Smart, 1986:161).  Of course, the 
would-be postmodernisation of Gramsci represents an outgrowth of his ideas on ideology 
and the construction of identity, which is at least in part open to the contingency of political 
organisation, rather than the spontaneous product of the ‘relations of production’ we find in 
Marx’s 1859 Preface to A Critique of Political Economy.   
 
Gramsci rejects Croce’s notion that thinking is divided into separate categories of activity 
(the practical, the aesthetic, and so on) such that it is ultimately possible to formulate an 
autonomous discursive line of politics.  However, whilst politics and economics are 
ultimately inseparable from the historical totality of social existence, as animated practices 
engaging social power they do assume significantly different operational characteristics.  
Gramsci states:   
 
[p]olitics becomes permanent action and gives birth to permanent organisations precisely in so far as it 
identifies itself with economics.  But it is also distinct from it, which is why one may speak separately of 
economics and politics, and speak of “political passion” as of an immediate impulse to action which is 
born on the ‘‘permanent and organic’’ terrain of economic life but which transcends it, bringing into 
play emotions and aspirations in whose incandescent atmosphere even calculations involving the 
individual human life itself obey different laws from those of individual profit, etc (Gramsci, 1971:139-
40). 
 
Yet, at the same time Gramsci wished to avoid dialectical ‘one-sidedness’.  Indeed, here 
Laclau is wrong to suggest that Gramsci “asserted [the] primacy of politics” (Laclau, 
1996:62).  With probably the revolutionary syndicalist Georges Sorel (1847-1922) in mind, 
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Gramsci immediately counter-posed the error of economic determinism with its opposite: a 
tendency to excesses of voluntaristic “desires and passions” he dubbed “ideologism” 
(Gramsci, 1971:178-9).  For Gramsci, excesses of eco-determinant and politico-voluntarist 
kinds are equally dialectically inert.  Gramsci brings the Cartesian duality (the material and 
thinking realms of existence) into dialectical reciprocation.  He acknowledges that ideology 
and the knowledge that informs it has no autonomous existence (Morera, 2000:43-5).  He 
saw ideas as material forces in the sense that they become attached to specific social forces 
pre-formed in the productive world, historically (Gramsci, 1971:165).  What Gramsci refers 
to as history in this regard is “determined social relations”; relations, by virtue of practiced 
and learned ideological articulations, which become an accurate basis for political action 
(Gramsci, 1971:133).  His point is that social relations are determined economically but not 
historical outcomes per se.  It is only when ideas become attached to these social relations 
that historical movement can occur.  In this case, ideas have to refer directly to certain social 
forces.  They must appeal to a ‘being’ already formed or in the process of being formed, 
historically.  In this sense ideas become attached to the conditions, will, aspirations, and so 
on, which result from the occupation of a certain pre-existing position in the social world.  
Not surprisingly, we find an insistence on this material grounding in Gramsci’s use of the 
term ‘hegemony’: 
 
[al]though hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the 
decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity (Gramsci, 
1971:161).   
   
The key phrase here is: “must necessarily be based”.  The task is to bring into dialectical 
reciprocation ‘being’ and ‘consciousness’.  This stems from Gramsci's recognition that the 
concept of being refers to socio-historical location – a product of involuntary productive 
configuration.  By contrast, the question of consciousness, or one’s conception of self, is 
moulded in a contested hegemonic (political) environment that is to some extent voluntary 
in that persuasion rather than force is the characteristic determinant.  Here, of course, Laclau 
and Mouffe detect a point of entry for their deconstructionist politics.   
 
Gramsci seems at once to be moving in the direction of contingency and yet he remains 
anchored to the basic assumptions of historical materialism – his 'in the last instance' 
economism.  By removing this remaining (and, by Laclau and Mouffe's account, redundant) 
economic vestige the hegemonic discourse is now freed of all socio-historical referents and 
occupies its own wholly autonomous space.  Yet, hermeneutically speaking, this re-reading 
of Gramsci denudes its originator’s notion of hegemony of its historiological orientation.  
The act of freeing the hegemonic discourse incurs the price of historiological abstraction.  In 
other words, the ultimate means employed by Gramsci to map hegemony is relinquished.   
 
Post-Marxism is thus wholly devoid of a theory of history or indeed any epistemic references 
employed by Gramsci to render hegemony and its political usage intelligible (Greaves, 
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2009:38).  Laclau and Mouffe effectively strip hegemony of any extra-discursive structural 
implication; in keeping with the postmodern turn, the discourse is given to refer to nothing 
outside of itself (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:85).  To assume otherwise, of course, would return 
the authors to the very essentialism they seek to avoid, and indeed to that which Gramsci is 
criticised for retaining (Lacalu & Mouffe, 1985:69).  Gramsci does provide a nuanced 
approach to class politics with the concept of ‘historical bloc’, but he makes no attempt to 
escape socio-economic class as an ontological referent.  For example, Gramsci writes of 
hegemony as “direction”/“domination” (Gramsci, 1971:12-13).  This begs an elementary 
political question: who is doing the directing/dominating and who is directed/dominated?  
Again, the answer Gramsci consistently supplies in his prison writing is that for hegemony to 
be historically significant it must become attached to historically specific ‘organic’ interests; 
those corresponding to a historical level of development in socialised production.  By way of 
an example, Gramsci observes the new Fordist techniques of assembly-line production then 
underway in the US.  The significance of this imposition is that it creates an immediate 
deficit of ideological regulation: since the workers cannot be prevented from thinking, and 
thus fomenting ad hoc feelings of anti-conformist sentiment corresponding, albeit perhaps 
imprecisely, but corresponding nonetheless, to a perceived reduction in their human status 
to that of the “trained gorilla” (Gramsci, 1985: 310).  This crisis had to be addressed by the 
owners of this mode of production by promoting Fordism somehow as morally and 
rationally digestible to the workers, and indeed the entire historical bloc.  This is done either 
directly, or, more likely, indirectly via the cadre of intellectuals acting as appointed 
‘mediators’ for the dominant group (Gramsci, 1971: 12).  
 
The inescapable upshot here is that ideology in the form of hegemony remains class-
necessitarian for Gramsci.  He rules out hegemony as non-political, spontaneous reflection, 
but it is nonetheless, like all things political, born out of necessity for direction imposed de 
factum on the historical bloc by the developing impulses of economic life.  For Gramsci, 
hegemony in all its complexity merely represents the political attempt to regulate (and out of 
necessity continually amend itself) according to the suggestions imposed by the economy.  
Hegemony becomes the only means to render history intelligible; by the same token history 
is the only means to render hegemony intelligible: 
 
[The] material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form 
and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically 
without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces (Gramsci, 
1971:377).    
 
Laclau and Mouffe's work on post-Marxist theory has been useful perhaps in necessitating a 
reconsideration of who Gramsci was and what he was actually saying, but it remains unclear 
who post-Marxist theory is addressing.  Indeed, this is undoubtedly the first question Gramsci 
would ask of it.  For Gramsci, hegemony is free in the moment of its construction but it can 
only posit itself meaningfully as ‘truth’ by attachment to the socio-historical reality that firstly 
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initiates the need for it.  If it fails in this regard it is ‘inorganic’ (a-historical) and quickly 
forgotten: 
   
[i]t is evident that [the superstructure] cannot just happen “arbitrarily”, around any ideology, simply 
because of the formally constructive will of a personality or a group which puts it forward solely on the 
basis of its own fanatical philosophical… convictions.  Mass adhesion or non-adhesion to an ideology is 
the real critical test of the rationality and historicity of modes of thinking.  Any arbitrary constructions 
are pretty rapidly eliminated by historical competition, even if sometimes, through a combination of 
immediately favourable circumstances, they manage to enjoy popularity of a kind; whereas constructions 
which respond to the demands of a complex organic period of history always impose themselves and 
prevail in the end (Gramsci, 1971:341). 
 
Roger Simon (1991) brings out another dubious assumption.  He locates Gramsci within the 
revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century.  However, he then argues that in the 
aftermath of revolutionary failure in Italy Gramsci recognises that history is “not going that 
way” (Simon, 1991:115).  In other words, Simon assumes that Gramsci concluded that 
revolution was not going to happen and he thus set out on an alternative course.  In short, 
Simon implies that Gramsci ended his life a non-revolutionary reformist.   
 
In this regard, Simon takes Gramsci’s concept of ‘war of position’ as connoting a strategic 
political distinction from the ‘war of movement’ of the Russian October Revolution of 1917 
(Simon, 1991:18).  Gramsci did certainly introduce the concept of ‘war of position’ into the 
Marxist vocabulary, but Simon is wrong to imply that this led him to advocate a reformist 
political outlook.  On the contrary, as Ernest Mandel states: 
 
there is not the slightest evidence that Gramsci ever abandoned the conception that the socialist 
revolution implies the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus (1978:201). 
 
Simon’s point rather typifies not so much the way history has gone, but the recent fate of the 
Gramscian legacy.  A distinct fracture has emerged between Gramsci’s complementary 
revolutionary strategies – those of wars of ‘position’ and ‘manoeuvre’ – which are taken to 
mean either ‘reform’ or ‘revolution’.  This misreads Gramsci’s argument.  The dispute it 
seems centres on a seeming fetishisation of the war of position tactic.  Indeed, how is this 
fought?  Who is doing the fighting?      
 
The war of manoeuvre is the classical Leninist assault and seizure of the instruments of 
capitalist oppression – the state.  In the aftermath of defeats in Italy and other advanced 
European countries, Gramsci realised that the revolutionary strategy had to include an attack 
on the consenting (hegemonic) components of state: 
 
The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and 
earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying — but this 
precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country (Gramsci, 1971:238). 
  
International Gramsci Journal No. 3 March 2011 
 43 
War of position is aimed at the fortresses and earthworks - an advanced assault on the 
consent mechanisms of the capitalist state.  Naturally, the means by which consent is 
generated will vary between western states.  This is what Gramsci means by his otherwise 
odd analogy that whilst all water is “H2O”, there are an infinite variety of “waters” 
(1995:305).     
 
In the light of revolutionary failure in Italy, Gramsci was brought to a more sophisticated 
appreciation of how the capitalist actively wins and maintains political power, and this is the 
basis of his unique contribution to Marxist theory.  His insights were intended to better 
equip the working class in its struggle to alter the course of history.  Gramsci sought to 
elaborate the Marxian problematic of subjective consciousness and its control in 
revolutionary situations and to include certain social forces not automatically included in the 
progressive historical thrust, such as the peasantry.  However, his was not an argument for 
consensual reformism in states with reasonably established parliamentary systems; his 
analysis remains fundamentally class-antagonistic and revolutionary in the full Leninist sense 
of the term.   
 
In this regard, Gramsci studied Italy’s idiosyncrasies.  He found that Italians had not made a 
nation of themselves as much as an ‘empire’ within state boundaries.  He noticed that the 
Italian capitalist class of the north of the country provided leadership that thrived upon the 
surreptitious monopolisation of culture in which the south was dismissed as “heathen and 
primitive” (King, 1987:12).  In perpetrating a common conviction that ‘high culture’, in 
terms of literature and art, and so forth, represented innate national properties, domination 
was effected by the leading social elements of society toward its masses (Dombroski, 
1986:113).  The masses themselves remained either non-contributory and ambivalent toward 
the higher national-cultural mysteries, or became imitative of them.  In both cases, the 
leading group’s hold on culture went unchallenged, particularly by the predominantly 
agrarian southern mass of Italy.  The point here is that cultural domination assumes political 
form as ‘capital’ once removed (or disguised) from production.   
 
That culture is once removed from economic determination has led to an understandable 
attraction to the semiotic and linguistic dimensions of Gramsci’s hegemonic theory (Ives, 
2004; Holub, 1992).  This is, of course, particularly pertinent to the national question in 
Gramsci’s thinking.   
 
Gramsci addressed the problem of national integration and exposed those features unique to 
Italy, but offered a theoretical pattern that may be applied elsewhere in corresponding 
circumstances.  Admittedly though, there was little time in his relatively short life to move on 
from the morass of national questions in which he had become immersed and the 
development of his internationalism undoubtedly suffered as a result (Harman, 1978:14).  
For good reasons, therefore, the essential Italian character of Gramsci’s Marxism is 
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emphasised in Salamini (1981); Cammett (1967); Pozzolini (1970); Boggs (1976 & 1984); 
Showstack Sassoon (1980); Joll (1977); Bellamy (2002); and Anderson (1976).   
Yet, by its nature, much of the work on Gramsci today in the Anglo-Saxon world that is 
Marxist, non-Marxist or post-Marxist, appears to reject this reading.  In one sense, this 
aspect of current analysis is promising.  Marxists need not retreat with Gramsci into 
specifically national relativity in order to preserve his intellectual character.  Gramsci’s 
political imagination was expansionary.  One could indeed call it internationalist to a level in 
which it rivals the position of Trotsky.  This was certainly the view of Gramsci 
contemporary Angelo Tasca (Spriano, 1979:131).  Gramsci was outward looking, as his 
practical activities in trying to balance the needs of the Italian proletariat with that of the 
Comintern indicate.  He argued that: 
 
[e]very relationship of “hegemony” is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within 
a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and 
world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations (Gramsci, 1971:350). 
 
Gramsci did not seek to elevate national factors over the greater global designs of 
communism initiated by Marx.  He merely wished to demonstrate the necessity to take into 
account contradictory national factors and thus to avoid crass generalisations that actually 
obstructed the global ambitions he otherwise supported. 
 
 
An Approach to Intellectual Archaeology 
 
EH Carr has written that there is “an unending dialogue between the present and the 
past… between the historian and his facts” (1961:30).  This is true, but how do we locate the 
facts?  How can we be sure we have them?   
 
Clearly under the influence of Gramsci’s contemporary Croce, RG Collingwood in An 
Autobiography (1939) argues that the historical actor must be seen as a ‘problem-solver’ and 
thus, in many respects, the study of history and philosophy correlate (1939:77).  The 
problems preoccupying the thinker condition the thought and the thought reflects an 
attempt to address the condition.  In The Idea of History (1946), Collingwood advocates an 
empathetic approach to the study of history; we must attempt to enter the mind of the 
historical subject and locate the active contextual factors which caused an author to commit 
word to paper.  In recent times, Quentin Skinner has become the inheritor of this 
‘interpretative’ method.  In The Foundation of Modern Political Thought (1978), Skinner 
summarises his method as an attempt to interpret the historical text in the context of the 
“general social and intellectual matrix” at large (1978:x).  “I begin”, he says, “by discussing 
what I judge to be the most relevant characteristics of the societies in and for which they 
originally wrote” (1978:x-xi).  In other words, Skinner argues for a relativistic approach to 
the historical exercise in which we are warned of the need to suppress our tendencies to 
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invest texts of the past with claims and assumptions the original author could not foresee 
from his/her historical standpoint.  We must search instead for the prevailing political, social 
and ideological climate in which the text was produced in order to recover the relationship 
between historical theory and historical practice (Skinner, 1978:xiii).  This compels us to 
discover why a text was produced in the way it was produced, at whom it was aimed, for 
what it was intended, and so forth.  To Skinner political thought has no innate and timeless 
quality to it; its historical context provides its only intelligible standpoint.  
‘Contextual relativism’ calls, therefore, for the ‘historicisation’ of the subject for the risks are 
these.  Firstly, we are in danger of transmitting to the past something of ourselves and of the 
present.  That is to say, we risk judgement with hindsight and certain developmental 
advantages the original thinker had no knowledge of and/or could not foresee.  Here, 
methodologically speaking, we might become ‘tourists’ lost without bearings in an unfamiliar 
location or, worse, insensitive ‘colonials’ seeking some trans-historical exportation of would-
be universal mores and understandings.  Secondly, we run the risk of wrenching 
incongruously into the present a portion of the past, putting us in mind of the ‘plundering’ 
that frequently passed as Egyptology in the nineteenth century and indeed the current ethical 
debate surrounding the Ancient Greek artefacts, the Elgin Marbles.   
However, having insisted on unlimited historical and contextual sensitivity, Skinner at least 
would be prepared to leave it at that.  Yet, what has been largely overlooked it seems is that 
Gramsci’s pursues this historiological methodology initiated originally by Croce, but, in 
adapting it to historical materialism, takes us much further than non-Marxist contextualist 
schools in our understanding of the ‘problems’ philosophy seeks to address.   
Gramsci’s notion ‘war of position’ is in effect the barometer of the condition of class war in 
a given era.  It reflects a battle for supremacy fought with hegemonic weaponry.  Hegemony 
at its highest and most coherent form is expressed in philosophy; this then becomes the 
intellectual armament to establish a way of life conducive to the interests of certain socio-
economic classes in a given epoch.  Political thought of the past thus becomes an expression 
of a greater underlying conflict.  As Gramsci writes: 
[t]he philosophy of an historical epoch is… nothing other than the “history” of that epoch itself, 
nothing other than the mass of variations that the leading group has succeeded in imposing on 
preceding reality (1971:345). 
 
Gramsci demands that the exploration of intellectual history takes account of not just its 
context but, specifically, its ‘hegemonic context’.  Thus, ‘truth’ is ‘historical truth’ in the 
sense that, at any point in time, it reflects a view of the world that has been successfully 
imposed on society sufficient to hold together the various heterogeneous class elements of a 
‘historical bloc’.  In other words, class war takes shape in economic life but is expressed in 
the superstructure.  In fact, there are competing superstructures, some more coherent than 
others, borne on the terrain of differing experiences within the dialectical totality of the 
historical bloc.   A philosophy might be ingenious but it is little more than the theorisation 
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of extant experience, or that already suggested by life.  The great task of a philosophy such as 
Marxism is to create conditions which will allow it to become critical, then to pass into 
general hegemonic currency for the whole of society, much, for example, as the ideas of 
Adam Smith, John Locke and JS Mill have accomplished for western liberal-capitalist 
culture. 
 
The history of ideas and philosophy in general is now tied by Gramsci to specific historical 
situations in which there is always an extant struggle to control popular beliefs and to 
consolidate a culture, not only in legality, but morally and ethically according to class 
interests.  In this way, Gramsci arrives at his assessment mentioned before that “ideas are 
themselves material forces” (Gramsci, 1971:165).   
 
Hence, for Gramsci, the historical text is related to material forces in that it is essentially a 
record of the attempt by one group in an economically conflictive society to stamp its values 
and interests on another by voluntary means.  Truth is therefore not eternal but qualified as a 
practical matter mediated by its dialectical insertion into the living reality of an epoch.  The 
written historical work in itself becomes an indicator of this attempt; an expression of the 
perceived needs of the social conditions in which it was produced.   
 
Of course, some ideologies reflect meaningful situations whilst others are wholly ephemeral.  
As discussed above, Gramsci provides the means to determine the difference by locating 
their socio-historical attachment to ‘organic’ forces, to the concrete needs of competing 
groups in the historical bloc. 
 
Hence, history does not merely relate to itself such that those who seek to understand it 
become inevitably caught up in an endless vortex of methodological relativity.  The class-
relative attribution of hegemony emerges as a historical constant in itself.  To Gramsci, 
history is certainly anything but a random and fathomless succession of accidents and 
occurrences of local and unconnected determination.  As Dimitrakos argues, Gramsci did 
not give equal weight to all ideologies in their cultural possibilities; class struggle and ideas 
associated with it were his objective historical points of reference (Dimitrakos, 1986:465).  
Therefore, any methodological relativism that exists in Gramsci that might allow for his 
transportation to different historical locations (i.e., the supposed postmodern) is immediately 
checked by his historicism.  In this sense, the organic function of postmodern ideology 
would need to be located.  Again, in this regard, to whom, and for whom, does post-
Marxism speak?    
 
I would argue that Gramsci’s Quaderni writing ought to be approached in this general vein; 
since it cannot be claimed that the author was unaware of the precise historical function for 
which they were intended.  There are other specific issues to be addressed in Gramsci's 
mature work, but this tends to support the overall point. 
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Reading the Quaderni – Expediency, Cryptology, Continuity 
 
At least some of the ongoing ambiguity surrounding Gramsci results from his prison 
writing which, following its publication in Italian in 1951, is often read as ‘text’ and not 
‘history’.  Subsequently, in 1971, the original Italian version of the Quaderni del carcere was 
selected, edited and translated into English by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 
as Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci.  I have encountered no direct criticism 
of this work.  It was sensitively and intelligently undertaken, and the editors made no attempt 
to make light of the now notorious problems they encountered in attempting to set the notes 
in order and minimise the losses incurred in translation.  Although inevitably ‘selective’, the 
finished work does appear both thorough and punctilious – note, for example, the copious 
editorial footnotes.  Mention should be made also of Hoare’s very helpful Introduction. 
 
At the time of writing, three volumes of a proposed five volume full English translation of 
the prison notebooks, in sequence, is underway by Gramsci scholar, Joseph A. Buttigieg 
(1992, 1996, 2007). These contain rich and detailed background notes on European and 
Italian intellectual cultural and political milieu in which Gramsci was writing while in prison. 
If anything these notes are more comprehensive than the 1971 Selections and the reader 
glimpses the evolution of Gramsci’s overall schema with some early notes being revisited in 
later notebooks. Similarly, Derek Boothman (1995) has edited and translated a fresh 
selection of the Quaderni from the originals held in the specially dedicated Il Fondazione Istituto 
di Gramsci (Gramsci Institute) in Rome.  Boothman’s selection has, for example, provided 
even greater insights into Gramsci’s intellectual relationship with Croce, and translation of 
material new to English readers is very much to be welcomed, but the benefits for 
Gramscian discussion may take some time to mature. 
 
It nonetheless remains the case that to the Anglo-Saxon world, at least, the edited English 
version of the Notebooks has come to represent something of a definitive manual of 
Gramsci’s thought.  Yet despite the best efforts of Hoare and Nowell Smith, the Notebooks 
remain wayward and fragmentary, understandably so; they were certainly never intended for 
publishing as they are.  Indeed, in this regard, an almost anticipatory Gramsci issues a 
caution.  When reading the historical text: 
 
[a] distinction should… be made within the work of the thinker under consideration between those 
works which he has carried through to the end and published himself or those which remain 
unpublished, because incomplete, and those which were published by a friend or disciple, but not 
without revisions, rewritings, cuts, etc., or in other words not without the active intervention of a 
publisher or editor.  It is clear that the content of posthumous works has to be taken with great 
discretion and caution, because it cannot be considered definitive but only as material still being 
elaborated and still provisional.  One should not exclude the possibility that these works, particularly if 
they have been a long time in the making and if the author never decided to finish them, might have 
been repudiated or deemed unsatisfactory in whole or in part by the author (Gramsci, 1971:384). 
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From the outset, then, it is perhaps arguable that current disputes concerning the meaning of 
Gramsci’s prison writing can be attributed in part to the fact that its author was not at the 
same time its editor.  At a minimum, the posthumous collation of fragmented notes is not 
automatically conducive to a tightly argued, rigorous and integrated argument in which the 
author’s thought can be easily tracked thematically.  Verdicchio seems to be correct in 
stating: 
 
Gramsci’s work does not represent a theoretical body, but presents a theoretical stance that, by not 
delineating or centering itself as a proponent of a strong “theory”, leaves its readers the possibility of 
interpretation and expansion.  Of course, this also leaves room for what may be called 
“misunderstanding” (1995:173). 
 
However, he continues: 
 
 ... as a whole the Gramscian corpus is an intricate set of details in which every fragment participates, 
thereby resulting in much less ambiguity than one might expect (1995:173). 
 
I take this to be correct, but Verdicchio might have expanded his point.  We could argue that 
what he calls the ‘Gramscian corpus’ must include his (Gramsci’s) earlier, pre-prison writing.  
This tells us of the importance of his historical conditions and its impact on his thinking, his 
major theoretical preoccupations, his politics and so forth.  A mental picture of Gramsci the 
theoretical and practical man does not form so readily on the sole basis of the Quaderni 
writings for they were never intended to be definitive.   
 
Gramsci’s early writing is important because, through it, we can observe the events, 
preoccupations and theoretical struggles he tries to resolve later in prison.  It provides also 
an invaluable insight into his intellectual character, often stated in uncompromising and 
unrestrained language and style (see Passolini, 1982:180-5).  There is far less attention to 
actual ‘will’ in the prison writings and much more of an elaboration of the difficulties 
standing in opposition to it as, generally speaking, a drier philosophical and theoretical 
undertaking.  Indeed, Femia has argued that the early and later Gramsci are distinguishable 
(1998:82).  It is true, for example, that Gramsci becomes more interested in Machiavelli in 
prison and that he never writes about factory councils again.  However, there is no 
suggestion that the overall character of the Quaderni is dislocated from class struggle.    
 
On encountering the Quaderni, it is immediately apparent that there is a remarkable change of 
style in Gramsci's writing when compared to the firebrand syntax of L’Ordine Nuouvo period 
of the early 1920s.   The most obvious explanation for this is expediency.  In prison, 
Gramsci employs benign language in order that he might continue his important work 
unhindered and avoid being denied certain reading and writing materials.  Apparently, the 
prison-censor was uninitiated in ‘Gramscian studies’ and not surprisingly easily outwitted.  
For much of it, Gramsci manages to make his writings appear as an exercise in philosophical 
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navel-gazing, that is, when they were clearly designed to enable the workers’ struggle in Italy 
to continue with updated theoretical weaponry.      
 
Indeed, considering the pamphleteering style of Gramsci's early political writing, it is 
immediately apparent that nowhere in the prison notebooks does he sound explicitly like the 
communist revolutionary he was.  Here we might offer a rather crude but effective 
illustration.  In his Lyons Theses, written for the Partito Communista d'Italia (PCd’I) congress of 
1926, Gramsci writes: 
 
[t]he transformation of the communist parties, in which the vanguard of the working class is assembled, 
into Bolshevik parties can be considered at the present moment as the fundamental task of the 
Communist International.  This task must be related to the historical development of the international 
workers’ movement, and in particular to the struggle which has taken place within it between Marxism 
and the currents which represented a deviation from the principles and practice of the revolutionary 
class struggle (1978:340). 
 
Many words used above were never penned by Gramsci after imprisonment in 1928, were 
routinely encoded thereafter and disguised, although, to the educated eye, in fairly blatant 
cryptography to deceive the prison censor.  Had such a paragraph as that above occurred in 
the Notebooks, one might venture, it would have appeared something like the following: [t]he 
transformation of the nomenclature for the working mass, in which the vanguard of the 
mass itself is assembled, into Jacobinist tendencies can be considered at the present moment 
as the fundamental task of the international Modern Prince (Comintern).  This task must be 
related to the historical development of the larger mass movement, and in particular to the 
struggle that has taken place within it between the Philosophy of Praxis and the currents that 
represented a deviation from the principles and practice of the historically imminent 
movement.  However, the radical polemicism remains if the historical and thematic context 
of Gramsci's sentences and subject matter of the Quaderni are understood. 
 
Whilst Gramsci’s Quaderni are a profoundly intellectually rewarding experience to read, no 
one can claim that they are immediately accessible.  They are often so steeped in the history 
and historical context of contemporary Italy that in the absence of knowledge of his pre-
prison writing, his political activism and practical conditions, one would find one's self lost 
in what amounts to an 'unfamiliar city' without a map.  Here the only way to navigate would 
be to observe how the ‘streets’ of his often baffling array of ideas relate to one another.  This 
would be a mammoth and doubtless less than successful exercise without some prior 
guidance.  Much of Gramsci's later work on intellectuals and hegemony, for example, relates 
to his observations of Italy’s national revolution and national characteristics, Lenin's 
achievements in Russia, experiments with factory councils and worker democracy, the role 
of the Communist Party, and the rise of fascism. Again, even with Buttigieg’s efforts, it does 
not make for the most accessible reading. 
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Leo Strauss, in Persecution and the Art of Writing (1952) argues that political philosophers of the 
past often wrote against the backdrop of persecution and fear.  This makes it necessary, so 
to speak, to read between the lines.  Gramsci's Quaderni certainly necessitate similar 
treatment.  They are shot through with curious sounding aphorisms, cryptology and 
historically qualified and extremely loaded phrases, often rendering the texts a distinctly 
obscure and deeply academic appearance.   
 
Hence, there are serious methodological preconditions for reading Gramsci's mature writing.  
Verdicchio's point above that the fragments of Gramsci's ideas participate in the whole is an 
extremely sagacious one.  The ideas of the Quaderni inter-lock.  They are nothing like the 
‘pick-and-mix’ they might appear to be such that the various ideas can be lifted and 
abstracted in isolation, as tempting as this might be.  Gramsci's ideas are connected by 
myriad fibres, “as with spaghetti, the attempt to lift bite-sizes from the plate often results in 
lifting too much to manage or nothing at all” (Greaves, 2005:4).  For example, when he 
refers to the political party as the ‘nomenclature of a class’, as he often does, one is 
immediately ushered into accepting an enormous range of practical and philosophical 
assumptions.  Moreover, that the Italian Communist Party might be dubbed the ‘Modern 
Prince’ embodies a quite distinctive interpretation of Machiavelli's original Prince that requires 
us to acknowledge his understanding of Machiavelli's historio-hegemonic function.   
 
Of course, the necessity for all this subterfuge and disguise and the fact that Gramsci was 
not able to present his work as a finished article must have been borne with extreme 
frustration by a man who, more than most, understood the unquestionable need for direct 
communication between workers and intellectuals, or what amounts to his perceived need to 
get his work into popular circulation.  Gramsci understood the need to conceive of the 
workers’ movement as an organic body.  In this regard it was necessary to establish a 
dialogue between the sensual experience of modern capitalist practices and the theoretical 
elements necessary to articulate it.  In this respect, in anticipation of a communist uprising, 
the Italian fascist regime was well advised to gaol Gramsci, although ironically it would 
require his work in gaol to reveal why exactly this was.  Removing Gramsci and his fellow 
‘thinking’ elements from the political scene effectively decapitated the Italian workers’ 
movement.  And, thus, by accident or design the scene was set for Gramsci’s prison writing 
to become subsequently adopted and interpreted by the academy, that is, rather than the 
people for whom it was originally designed and intended – the Italian working classes. 
 
One can only lament the inherent loss of historical grounding this ironic historical twist has 
entailed for much subsequent evaluation of the Quaderni.  If we imagine the Gramsci of the 
prison years in isolation of the rest of his life, then the Quaderni writings would need to be 
taken as an example of miraculous, super-human abstraction.  Yet, it is significant that 
Gramsci himself never accorded this miracle to any of the historical thinkers he most 
admired – i.e., Machiavelli, Marx and Lenin.  As has been said, for Gramsci, all great political 
International Gramsci Journal No. 3 March 2011 
 51 
thought is essentially an expression of a war of position for intellectual supremacy, but this is 
always rooted in class struggle and the attempt to establish a way of life on behalf of 
identifiable social forces.  This is true of Gramsci also.  That is to say, Gramsci's ideas have 
no independent existence.  They refer continually to the reality of social existence already 
constructed outside of the text itself.   
 
Of course, for Gramsci, what was unique about Marx was that this struggle had finally 
reached the level of ‘self-consciousness’.  Thought had finally reached the stage where it not 
only addressed a historical situation, it was aware of itself as a product of it, and thus what it 
was doing or seeking to do on the ground, in ‘concrete’, as Gramsci was fond of saying. 
 
It therefore must be insisted that Gramsci be read in the same way.  There is no other means 
to effectively map the Quaderni.  Gramsci’s generic philosophical framework had to have 
been in place, if not necessarily formulated in detail, before he was cut-off from his historical 
grounding and imprisoned.  This was necessary because it allowed him to apply his own 
conception of the function of philosophy to operate in terms and conditions he understood.  
In fact, his principal theoretical and strategic conceptions actually germinated in the class 
struggle of the 1920s and came to fruition in his prison notes.  Many notable Gramsci 
experts concur on this point.  For example, Joll (1977:105) states that in prison Gramsci was 
engaged in “analysing the past”; there was “no stupendous rupture in Gramsci’s intellectual 
development since 1919-20” (Davidson, 1977:242); and Hoare writes: 
 
[e]ven some of the most important theoretical formulations of the Prison Notebooks were essentially 
elaborations of conclusions he had reached in the period of his active involvement in the class struggle 





 We ought to be recalling Antonio Gramsci’s work with the same consciousness as 
Gramsci.  Gramsci was acutely aware of the role of ideas in society and thus his ideas were 
‘self-conscious’, or aware of the specific historical terrain that produced them and indeed the 
terrain into which they were to be inserted as dialectical weapons.  That is to say, Gramsci's 
ideas were historiological.  They were addressed to a specific target audience at a particular 
time with a precise purpose in mind.  In fact, Gramsci's prison writing was a continuation of 
class warfare as ‘war of position’, an attack on the consent mechanisms of capitalist 
oppression.  It is Machiavellian in the sense that it reveals to his audience the techniques 
used in the same way that Machiavelli revealed how the Medici family held on to power in 
Florence.  The war of position tactic actually provides Gramsci’s life with intellectual 
continuity and political consistency; even if the nature of the struggle was perceived to have 
changed, struggle between classes was what it was.   
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If this is accepted then we are compelled to read Gramsci with an interpretive strategy that 
acknowledges the hegemonic conditions in which the writing was undertaken (the economic, 
political, social and cultural); we may then question whether what we are doing with Gramsci 
is appropriate, responsible and thus useful.  Contemporary writers should be wary of 
dislocating Gramsci from context.  Ideas are material forces; they speak to and for groups of 
people whose existence and identity are already formed, but through adoption of the right 
description of that identity the determinant levers of history can be controlled.  This was 
always Gramsci’s intention – the complete humanisation of history by virtue of our 
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